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4 . 1   I N T R O D U C T I O N
Things in the world change all the time. These changes (or 
most of them, anyway1) do not just happen by themselves, 
but because they are caused to occur. Since the beginning 
of rational thought, scientists and philosophers alike have 
considered it as one of their main objectives to discover and 
understand the causes of changes in nature. Causation has 
therefore played a crucial role in nearly every attempt to 
make sense of the fabric of the world. Immanuel Kant, for 
instance, thought that causation was one of the necessary 
categories of thought by means of which we structure the 
different sensory impressions we have of the world in order 
to bring them into the order of one single and unified experi-
ence. Almost two hundred years later, John Mackie captured 
the central importance of causation for our understanding 
of the world in his famous slogan that causation is the “ce-
ment of the universe” (1974); for causation, according to 
Mackie, is what holds together earlier and later stages in the 
4
1.  Some people would argue that there are also changes which happen 
spontaneously: just on their own. But we can set the question aside here 
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history of the universe, which would otherwise occur as un-
connected bits and pieces, just one after the other. However, 
while nearly all philosophers agree on the crucial impor-
tance of causation, there is no consensus at all on how cau-
sation itself should be understood: what is it for x to cause 
y? And just to give you a brief glimpse of some of the many 
hotly debated subquestions over which the debate has been 
raging:  is causation an irreducible primitive connection, or 
can it be (explanatorily, or metaphysically) reduced to some-
thing else? What kind of entities stand in causal relations to 
one another: only events, or also substances? Or facts, rather 
than events? Only particular entities, or abstract entities as 
well? How is causation related to explanation? And is cau-
sation an extensional relation, which holds between two 
entities no matter how these entities are described, or an in-
tentional one, which holds between entities only when they 
are described in particular ways?
Most of the modern debate about causation has been 
shaped by the influential empiricist tradition whose main 
historical proponent has been David Hume, and which has 
attempted to reduce causation to the obtaining of (certain 
types of) regularities. As we have already seen in  chapter 2 
(section 2.4), Hume criticized the concept of causal power 
on the grounds that it failed to meet the empiricist crite-
rion for meaningfulness which he advocated. This crite-
rion required that we could trace back concepts to original 
impressions (as Hume puts it: all our ideas “are copied from 
impressions”).2 Inherently bound up with Hume’s critique 
of the concept of power was his critique of the “traditional” 
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concept of causation. This is not surprising, because Hume 
considered the notion of “necessary connection,” which on 
the traditional view was part and parcel of the notion of 
cause, as practically synonymous to the notion of power.3 
The view that a cause is somehow necessarily connected to 
its effect— the cause “makes” its effect occur, and the effect 
“cannot help occurring” once the cause is active— is both 
intuitively appealing and has been historically highly influ-
ential. Causes, we normally think, make things happen, and 
this is what allows us to explain these effects by referring to 
their causes. But, Hume argued, we have no “original experi-
ence” of necessitation that could serve as the original experi-
ence to which the concept of causation could be traced back. 
Focusing on presumed causal connection between events 
(i.e., cases where presumably one event causes another one), 
Hume wrote:
There is not, in any single, particular instance of cause 
and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power 
or necessary connection. (An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, 63)
When we consider events or objects themselves, and consider 
particular (supposed) instances of causation, Hume thought, 
we would never find any real element corresponding to the 
idea of a causal nexus or a necessary connection. What we 
do observe is only that certain types of events are generally 
conjoined: events of one type generally follow upon events of 
another type.
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All events seem entirely loose and separate  .  .  .  one event 
follows another; but we can never observe any tie between 
them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. (An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, 74)
Having observed this general conjunction, we come to ex-
pect, when we see an event of the first type, that an event of 
the second type will follow. And this habitual conjunction 
we then project onto the world, thinking that the connec-
tion we make in our mind mirrors something really out there 
in the succession of events itself. The source of our idea of 
causation is therefore, on Hume’s account, something merely 
subjective.
The projectivist or antirealist element of Hume’s own 
view— which claims that causation was “nothing real in the 
world” but merely a projection of our minds— was, how-
ever, not to be as influential as the positive thesis about cau-
sation that could be developed from Hume’s arguments, 
namely, that causation could be analyzed in terms of two 
other ideas:  (i) temporal succession and (ii) constant con-
junction. Take Hume’s own proposed “definition” of “cause” 
in the Enquiry:
A cause is an object, followed by another, where all objects 
similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. 
(An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 76)
Or, to put this more precisely: for x to be a cause of y, (i) y 
has to follow x in time and (ii) there must be a constant and 
regular pattern of items like y following upon items like x. 
This proposal has three important implications for the na-
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which have become key tenets of the Humean “orthodoxy” 
on causation.
First, cause and effect must be things that can “follow one 
another,” and, despite Hume’s talk of “objects” this best fits the 
case where one event causes another. By contrast, substances, 
which most of the philosophical tradition prior to Hume had 
considered to be paradigmatic causes, can rarely be said to 
“follow one another”— except in the special sense in which 
descendants can be said to “follow” their forebears, which is 
certainly not a model for standard causal interactions. Nor is 
it the case in normal causal interactions that an event tempo-
rally “follows” a substance: this would require the substance 
to go out of existence before or when the event occurs, which 
is, again, a rather special case. As a result, Humeans gener-
ally came to hold that the causal relata are events rather than 
substances.
Second, on the Humean view, particular instances of 
causation necessarily presuppose general regularities: for ex-
ample, your turning the light switch on now can cause the 
light to go on immediately afterward only if there is some 
general regularity in the background. This regularity need 
not directly connect the events we actually perceive (per-
haps you have only turned this particular light switch once 
in your life), but may only connect the “hidden” intermediate 
steps between visible cause and effect. But still, on this view, 
there can be no genuinely singularist causation, in the sense 
that one individual event might cause another one no matter 
what else is going on in the world. Third, on Hume’s view we 
can provide an analysis of causation in terms of things that 
are not themselves causal. Causal facts are completely de-
termined by the non- causal facts in the world (i.e., the facts 
about temporal succession and regularities). Once the latter 
C4.P10
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facts are all fixed, we also know what causes what, and we do 
not have to introduce the causal facts as independent extras.
Contemporary Humeans still mostly accept these three 
claims, even though they disagree with Hume with respect 
to the kind of general pattern that supposedly underlies in-
dividual instances of causation. Most contemporary neo- 
Humeans believe that such general patterns are not just 
regularities that hold de facto, but must be genuine laws 
of nature that support counterfactual statements. For this 
reason, their views are also called “nomological” views 
of causation. As they have shaped so much of the modern 
debate, nomological views of causation that follow Hume 
in rejecting singular causation, and in taking causal facts 
to be determined by non- causal facts, are a useful point of 
departure for our following discussion. In the next section 
(4.2), we will consider two influential recent versions of the 
Humean approach, and examine some of the problems these 
accounts encounter. Such problems indicate that there are 
still major unresolved issues in the Humean approach. This 
motivates us to turn to Aristotle’s account of causation (sec-
tion 4.3), which will provide a useful foil for investigating 
how the shift toward realism with respect to powers that we 
have discussed in  chapter  2 gives us new resources to ac-
count for causation in terms of the exercise of causal powers 
(section 4.4). In that context, we will also consider whether 
an account of causation in terms in powers can explain the 
direction of causation, by means of the distinction between 
active and passive powers. We will conclude the chapter by 
turning to mental causation, that is, the question of how 
mental occurrences or entities can cause physical changes 
and vice versa (section 4.5).
C4.P12
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4 . 2   S O M E  N E O -  H U M E A N 
D E V E L O P M E N T S
As we have just seen, contemporary Humeans tend to as-
sume that the regularities that underlie particular causal 
connections are not just general regularities that hold as 
a matter of fact, but laws of nature. In making this move, 
Humeans do not usually take themselves to necessarily be 
in opposition to Hume himself, who writes, directly after 
the definition of “cause” in the Enquiry that we have quoted 
earlier: “Or, in other words, where the first object had not been, 
the second never had existed” (An Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding, 76). These lines suggest that Hume thought 
of causation not simply as based on general regularities, 
but (also) in terms of necessary conditions.4 The latter is a 
stronger conception, since some regularities are merely con-
tingent. You can imagine, for instance, that, de facto, all men 
in a certain community put on their hats when going out, but 
this does not allow you to conclude that if Jim, a man from 
that community, had not put on his hat, he wouldn’t have 
gone out, because Jim might have had to go out so urgently 
that he would have done so even if he had forgotten his hat 
at home.
Many metaphysicians of neo- Humean allegiance with 
respect to causation endorse this stronger conception, and 
have taken laws of nature to be the obvious candidates for 
AQ: In FN 4, 
single quotes 
O.K. here, 
or change to 
double? Please 
clarify
4. At the same time, Hume’s emphatic critique of the supposedly ‘neces-
sary connection’ involved in causation more strongly suggests that he did 
want to settle for merely regularities. As a consequence, contemporary 
Humeans, while being generally inspired by him, can hardly claim to de-
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what explains why a cause is necessary for its effect to occur. 
If there is a law of nature that an event of type A follows upon 
an event of type B, then we do have a good explanation of 
why, ceteris paribus, if the B- type event had not occurred, 
the A- type event would not have occurred either. As a result, 
many Humeans, from the nineteenth century onward, came 
to think of causes as necessary— or, going beyond Hume, 
necessary and sufficient— conditions for their effects (most 
notably John Stuart Mill). But this had the unwelcome effect 
of putting the philosophical analysis of cause very much at 
odds with our ordinary way of talking, both in everyday life 
and in scientific practice. For we call many factors “causes” 
that are not, strictly speaking necessary— or sufficient— for 
their effect. When we regard, for example, the throwing of 
a stone as a genuine cause of the breaking of the window, 
the throwing of the stone was neither necessary for the latter 
(since the window could have broken in many other ways as 
well) nor sufficient (since the window would not have broken 
had something arrested the stone in its flight). Presumably, 
in most cases, only very encompassing states of affairs con-
cerning the whole environment of a change are truly suffi-
cient, or necessary, for bringing about the effect, but we are 
prepared to call less encompassing factors “causes,” too.
One of the most influential Humean attempts to re-
solve this discrepancy is due to J. L. Mackie, who in his The 
Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (1974) tried to 
analyze the relation between particular causes and particular 
effects in terms of a sophisticated combination of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. As Mackie argued, a cause is not 
(normally) sufficient for its effects, nor is it necessary. To take 
Mackie’s own example: a short circuit in a house causes a fire. 
The short circuit is not sufficient on its own to cause the fire, 
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because without the presence of inflammable material and 
oxygen (etc.), the short circuit would not have brought about 
the fire. Neither is the short circuit necessary, since some-
thing other than the short circuit could, in principle, have 
caused the fire as well. Instead, Mackie claims, the short cir-
cuit is an Insufficient but Necessary part of a set of conditions 
which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient (for the effect). The 
cause is thus what he calls an INUS condition. The (overall) 
sufficient- condition is a very large collection of contributory 
conditions that absolutely suffices for the effect on this occa-
sion. Without the short circuit this collection would not have 
sufficed for the effect, though, and would not have led to the 
fire. Mackie’s analysis allows us to call factors “causes” that are 
by themselves neither necessary nor sufficient for the effects. 
At the same time, it captures the idea that in some respect, 
namely under the very precise conditions that obtained, the 
cause was necessary and sufficient for the effect. For given 
the other conditions, it was both. Thus, given the presence 
of the oxygen and of the inflammable material as well as the 
absence of possible interveners that would have prevented 
the outbreak of the fire, the short circuit was sufficient for the 
outbreak fire. At the same time, given these other conditions 
and given that there was no alternative factor that would have 
led to the fire in combination with them, the short circuit 
was still necessary for these other conditions to lead to the 
outbreak of the fire. So maybe we could say: the cause is nec-
essary and sufficient under the circumstances for its effects. In 
limiting cases, Mackie admits, a cause may even be necessary 
and sufficient on its own, though: causes are, as he puts it, at 
least, INUS conditions for their effects (1993, 36).
Mackie’s proposed analysis has received a wide range 
of criticisms. These criticisms were in part inherited as 
C4.P16
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criticisms of the original Humean analysis that Mackie was 
trying to refine, and in part specifically targeted at Mackie’s 
own suggestions. Let us briefly consider here three difficulties 
that were raised against Mackie’s account.
The first concerns the distinction between causes and 
background conditions. An obvious consequence of Mackie’s 
analysis is that every event has many causes. (As we noted, 
this makes the analysis in one respect attractive.) For just 
as the short circuit is sufficient and necessary for its effects 
given the other circumstances (including the presence of ox-
ygen), so the presence of oxygen is sufficient and necessary 
for its effects, given the other circumstances (including the 
short circuit). And we can say the same about every other 
INUS condition of any effect. Some philosophers, however, 
resist the idea that things other than events (like the short cir-
cuit) are causes, and say that other factors can only be “back-
ground” or “enabling” conditions. If they are right, Mackie’s 
proposal, which rules out this distinction, has an obvious 
problem. However, in Mackie’s defense, it must be pointed 
out that it is very hard to apply the “cause- versus- background 
condition” distinction to particular cases without stretching 
the facts to fit the theory, or making ad hoc stipulations. 
When we talk about, say, “the cause of Caesar’s death,” this 
ought not to be taken literally, at face value. Caesar died 
from a massive loss of blood, but he also died because he 
was stabbed, and because his bodyguard was not around 
to protect him that day, and because he was ambitious and 
wanted to become king of Rome. Is there any reason to think 
that only one of these things is “the real cause” of Caesar’s 
death, or that only a few of them are “the real causes”? That 
the absence of his bodyguard was not a proper cause, but 
only a background or “enabling” condition that facilitated 
C4.P17
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that Caesar would be killed by the assassins, but did not it-
self cause his death? Furthermore, one may be skeptical that 
an in- principle distinction between causes and background 
conditions has to be part and parcel of any viable theory of 
causation, for what we consider as background conditions— 
rather than causes— in a particular case depends, primarily, 
on our interests or expectations concerning the “normal state 
of affairs” in situations like the one at issue, and these expec-
tations and interests change all the time. This suggests that 
the distinction between causes and background conditions is 
a pragmatic one, rather than a metaphysical one. Therefore, 
even if Mackie’s theory has no good way to distinguish be-
tween background conditions and causes, this need not be a 
decisive objection against it.
A second difficulty raised against Mackie’s account 
concerns the relation between causation and determinism. 
Mackie’s account of causes as INUS conditions presupposes 
that there is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the 
effect (even though this condition will encompass more 
than just individual causes taken singly). Positing sufficient 
conditions is unproblematic in cases of deterministic causa-
tion (i.e., where the effect must follow the cause); however, 
in nature there are also cases of indeterministic causation, 
or so many believe, such as quantum mechanical processes 
(where the probability of the occurrence of the effect is sig-
nificantly raised by the presence of the cause, but the effect 
is not necessitated). When an effect has only indetermin-
istic causes, there will be no INUS conditions for this ef-
fect, simply because there is no set of previous conditions 
which absolutely ensured that this effect would take place. 
(Even a combination of causal factors, in such cases, merely 
raises the probability of the occurrence of the effect.) Mackie’s 
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conception of “cause,” however, rules out indeterministic 
causes from the start.
Finally, a third difficulty raised against Mackie’s account 
concerns the direction of causation. It is usually thought that 
causation has a direction, “from” the cause “to” the effect. This 
directedness expresses itself in a formal feature of the causal 
relation, namely that it is nonsymmetric: if x causes y, then (in 
standard cases at least) y does not cause x; or at the very least, 
it does not follow that y causes x. One well- known challenge 
for those who attempt to define “cause” in terms of sufficient 
and necessary conditions is how to account for this direction-
ality. Accounting for the directionality of causation is evidently 
a problem if one assumes that cause just is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for the effect— since if x is necessary and suf-
ficient for y, then it follows that y is necessary and sufficient for 
x, too. But the general problem is inherited by accounts like 
Mackie’s, because, as we saw, Mackie requires that if “A causes 
B” then A is at least an INUS condition for B, and allows that 
A can be necessary and sufficient for B on its own. The standard 
Humean way to account for the direction of causation is to use 
the direction of time (recall Hume’s formulation: “followed by 
another”). However, this strategy will not work when we look 
at cases of simultaneous causation, since here cause and effect 
happen at the same time. (And Mackie cannot appeal to the 
direction of time to underpin the directionality of causation, 
because he accepts the in- principle possibility of backward 
causation, where an event later in time causes an earlier event 
[1993, 51].)
David Lewis’s theory of causation5 promises to resolve 
at least the second and the third difficulty raised against 
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Mackie’s proposal. Lewis follows quite closely Hume’s second 
definition of “cause”:  “where the first object had not been, 
the second never had existed,” and provides a counterfactual 
analysis of (certain paradigm forms of) causation. As we saw 
in section 3.4, Lewis famously used the “toolbox” of possible 
worlds and the notion of comparative overall similarity of 
possible worlds to account for the truth conditions of coun-
terfactual conditionals.
When “A ☐→ C” is true, when can say that “C 
counterfactually depends on A.”6 Using this notion of 
counterfactual dependence, which is a relation between 
propositions, Lewis defines causal dependence, which is 
a relation between particular events. Where “c” and “e” are 
terms denoting particular events (e.g., “the assassination of 
the Archduke Ferdinand,” “the First World War”) and “O” is 
a predicate of events, meaning “occurs,” and “~” is negation, 
causal dependence can be defined as follows:
e causally depends on c iff:
(1) Oc ☐→ Oe; and
(2) ~Oc ☐→ ~Oe
If c and e are actual events, then (1)  is true because of the 
stipulation that the actual world is always the closest world to 
itself. Since c and e actually exist, there is a c- and- e world that 
is closer to actuality than any c- and- not- e world, simply be-
cause the actual world is a c- and- e world. And in any case of 
causation, the cause and the effect must actually exist. Clause 
AU: Please do 
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critical reappraisal see his 2004.
6. For the version of Lewis’s account and the terminology we are following 
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(2)  is therefore the one which is the real heart of Lewis’s 
counterfactual analysis of causation: it says that if e had not 
occurred, e would not have occurred. This is what it is for e 
to causally depend on c.
Causal dependence is not yet the same as causation, 
though:  Lewis says that causal dependence between actual 
events implies causation, but not vice versa. This is because 
causation is defined in terms of a chain of counterfactual 
dependence. A causal chain is defined as a sequence of ac-
tual events, c, d, e  .  .  .  and so on, where d depends on c, e 
depends on d, et cetera. Then c is a cause of e when there is a 
causal chain leading from c to e. Lewis’s definitions allow that 
there could be a sequence where a causally depends on b, b 
causally depends on c, but a does not causally depend on c. 
Nonetheless, Lewis says, it will still be true that in this case, c 
is a cause of a. Imagine, for instance, that your mother woke 
you up this morning, so that you would get the bus and get 
to your philosophy class on time. If you had not been woken 
up by your mother at 8 a.m., you would not have been at 
the bus stop by 8:25 a.m., but only at 8:40 a.m., and would 
therefore not have caught the bus at 8:25 a.m.; and if you had 
arrived at the bus stop only at 8:40 a.m., there wouldn’t have 
been another bus that would have got you to class on time. 
So, your mother waking you up, by causing you to arrive at 
the bus stop in time, caused you to get to the class on time. 
But you could have come to the class on time even if your 
mother had not woken you up early; if, for just that eventu-
ality, your father had already promised to give you a lift to 
school in his car. (His promise, however, was restricted to the 
case in which your mother would not have woken you up in 
time: once she did wake you up and you were on your way, he 
was no longer available, for example, to pick you up from the 
C4.P26
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bus- stop and drive you to the class.)7 So getting to the class 
on time did not causally depend on your mother’s waking 
you up early enough. Lewis thus defines causation as the an-
cestral of the relation of causal dependence. The ancestral of 
a relation R is that relation that stands to R as the relation of 
being an ancestor stands to the relation of being a parent. The 
relation “ancestor” can be roughly defined as follows: x is an 
ancestor of y if x is a parent of y, or x is a parent of a parent 
of y, or x is a parent of a parent of a parent of y . . . and so on. 
While “x is a parent of y” is not transitive (your grandmother 
is a parent of your parent, but not your parent herself), “x is 
an ancestor of y” is. The relations “x causally depends on y” 
and “x is a cause of y” have the same structure.
How does Lewis’s proposal fare with regard to the second 
and third problems for Mackie’s analysis? With regard to the 
second problem, Lewis’s account is not committed to the 
idea that all causation must be deterministic. As long as we 
can make sense of comparative similarity in cases where only 
probabilistic connections between events are at stake, Lewis’s 
analysis of causation will work for such cases, too. With re-
gard to the third problem, to account for direction of cau-
sation in a way that does not just posit that the direction of 
causation is the direction of time, Lewis has tried to show 
from considerations about comparative similarity among 
possible worlds that the direction of time does not have to 
be put in “out of the blue,” but falls naturally out of the anal-
ysis of counterfactual dependence. (The key idea, which we 
cannot go into in detail here, is that in our world, events have 
7. This bit of the example is important because it ensures that your being at 
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more effects than causes, and that, as a result, worlds with 
the same or very similar pasts are bound to be more similar 
to one another than worlds with the same futures.) Not eve-
ryone has been persuaded by this answer to the third diffi-
culty raised against Mackie’s account, though, and it is also 
to be noted that Lewis’s response does not work for cases of 
simultaneous causation (where the direction of causation ob-
viously cannot be the direction of time).
However, Lewis’s proposal faces some additional 
problems. To begin with, there seem to be many cases of 
counterfactual dependence between events that are not cases 
of causation or causal dependence (see, e.g., Kim 1993). 
Assume, for instance, that Jim has promised Jane not to drink 
alcohol tonight, and this was the only promise Jim has ever 
made to Jane. If Jim did drink alcohol tonight, he thereby 
broke the promise. Also, given that this was his only promise 
to Jane, if he hadn’t drunk alcohol tonight, he wouldn’t have 
broken his promise to her. So both conditions for causal de-
pendence, in Lewis’s analysis, are satisfied. But Jim’s drinking 
alcohol didn’t cause him to break the promise to Jane:  his 
drinking constituted a breaking of the promise. Generalizing 
this point, philosophers like Jaegwon Kim have objected to 
Lewis’s account that causation is only one of many kinds of 
dependence relation that can underlie the counterfactual 
conditionals which Lewis takes to be the core of causal de-
pendence. So how can we pick out the causal dependence 
relations from the others? (We cannot pick it out, obvi-
ously, by saying that it is a dependence that rests on causal 
connections, if we want to provide an analysis of causation 
that is not circular!)
In addition, there are some types of case involving causa-
tion that Lewis’s analysis does not seem to cover, in particular, 
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cases of causal overdetermination and pre- emption. In over-
determination cases, you have two sufficient causes, such that 
each of them could be absent (singly), and the effect would 
still obtain. Assume, for instance, that two assassins, inde-
pendently from each other, shoot President Kennedy, such 
that their bullets enter his heart at exactly the same time. 
Arguably in such a case, if the first assassin had not fired, the 
second would still have killed President Kennedy. And the 
same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the second assassin. So 
none of their shots was necessary, and for each the counter-
factual “If the shot had not been fired, the president would 
not have died” is false. Nonetheless, we would usually con-





Pre- emption cases are trickier. In pre- emption cases, 
event A causes event B, but if A had failed to obtain or to 
have a causal influence, there was a “back- up” cause waiting 
“in the wings” that would have caused B if A had failed to ob-
tain or to have a causal influence. In such cases, even if A is a 
cause of B, B would still have obtained if A had been absent. 
8. Lewis himself does not want to address these cases because, as he puts 
it, he lacks “firm naïve opinions about them” (1986b, 171 fn. 12). But many 
philosophers did have stronger positive intuitions about these cases.
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Imagine that one of the two assassins shoots the president, hits 
his mark and kills him instantaneously. The second assassin 
was just there as a “back- up,” who fired his shot two seconds 
after the first, to “make sure” in case the first assassin’s bullet 
was to go wrong (or in case the first assassin had changed his 
mind and not fired at all). Let us assume that the second as-
sassin was a dead- certain shot, and his bullet would have cer-
tainly have killed the president; however, when it arrived, the 
president was already dead (since already the first bullet had 
been lethal). In this case, clearly it was the first assassin’s shot 
that killed the president (since the second assassin’s bullet 
arrived too late). Nonetheless, it is not true that if the first as-
sassin hadn’t shot, the president wouldn’t have died (since, in 
that case, the second assassin’s bullet would have killed him). 
Thus the analysis says— incorrectly— that the first assassin’s 
shot did not cause the president’s death.
Lewis’s own response to pre- emption cases appeals 
to his definition of causation in terms of a chain of caus-
ally dependent events. The first assassin’s shot causes the 
president’s death because there is a chain of events between 
this shooting and the death (the bullet flying out of the gun 
and through the air, hitting the president’s head, etc.). Each 
event in this chain is causally dependent on the one before, 
but this does not mean that the death is causally dependent 
on the shooting (remember the going- to- class case discussed 
earlier). So, the fact that there is a back- up does not prevent 
the shot from causing the death. However, this response 
strategy only works when the pre- emption case involves a 
chain of intermediate causal steps, and causal dependence 
only fails for the earlier steps in the chain. But could the pos-
sible pre- empter not be waiting in the wings just at the very 
last (or the only) step in the chain? Imagine, for instance, 
AQ: Please note 
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that a magician can directly cause the president’s death by 
casting a spell. If the magician casts the spell immediately 
before the bullet hits the president and his saying the spell 
directly kills the president, the only cause of the president’s 
death is the spell, not the bullet (which arrived too late to 
kill the president). Nonetheless, that the bullet was already 
underway made it necessary that the president would die an-
yway. This seems to be a case of pre- emption not amenable 
to Lewis’s response strategy, since the causal chain from spell 
to death involves no further intermediate steps and causal 
dependence does not hold with regard to the only step in the 











Even refined neo- Humean theories such as Mackie’s and 
Lewis’s thus face serious difficulties (of which we have 
only been able to discuss a very small selection here). 
Such difficulties have motivated a shift of interest among 
metaphysicians: an increasing number of philosophers have 
come to think that these difficulties make it worthwhile to 
look back at the Aristotelian conception of causation that 
Hume had tried to demolish, and are exploring whether it 
might be fruitful to start afresh from there. That’s what we 
will do in the following two sections of this chapter.
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4 . 3   A R I S T O T L E ’ S  T H E O RY 
O F   C AU S AT I O N
Aristotle famously distinguished four types of cause.9 Take a 
particular statue made by Fidias, the statue of Athena on the 
Acropolis in Athens. Aristotle’s view is that the marble from 
which it is made is its material cause; the form (of Athena) is 
its formal cause; Fidias who sculpted it, its efficient cause; and 
the purpose for which it was made, for example, to adorn the 
Acropolis, its final cause. Today we find it somewhat odd to 
talk of each of these four things as “causes,” since we have 
become used to reserving the term “cause” to the third kind 
of Aristotelian causes, namely efficient causes (and, at best, 
regard the other things as “explanatory factors”). But this ap-
parent oddness is mostly due to the fact that our conception 
of causation radically changed in the seventeenth century, as 
part of the rise of the natural sciences and their paradigms of 
explanation. For Aristotle himself, by contrast, as well as for 
other philosophers of antiquity and the middle ages, there 
are more types of cause than the efficient cause,10 and he has 
no problem seeing all his four causes as genuine “causes,” for 
which there should be a unified metaphysical account. The 
account he offers is, simply put, that all causes are powers, 
and causation, of all kinds, is the exercise or manifestation 
of mutually dependent causal powers. The mutual depend-
ence among powers is grounded in the fact that for Aristotle 
they are (monadic) properties of a special type that he calls 
“relatives” (as we saw in  chapter 2; remember the passage we 
9. This section draws on Marmodoro (2007).
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quoted from Categories 7b6– 7:  “if there is no master there 
is no slave either”). The relevant powers are mutually de-
pendent not for their existence but for their exercise:  any 
agent requires a patient upon which to act.
To get a better idea of this theory, let us focus on the anal-
ysis Aristotle gives of the causal interaction (of the efficient 
causation type) between mover and movable in his discus-
sion of kinesis (change, motion) in Physics III. Aristotle’s def-
inition of motion (see, e.g., 201a9– 10; 201a27– 9; 201b4– 5; 
202a13– 4) is fairly broad11 and includes what we would con-
sider uncontroversial and paradigm instances of causation, 
such as building, heating, and doctoring. Thus, Aristotle’s 
account of the mover- movable interaction will serve as a 
good model for explicating more generally his metaphysics 
of causation. What are the key elements of a causal interac-
tion such as the one existing between a mover and a moved? 
Aristotle begins with a programmatic statement: accounting 
for motion does not require appealing to any new, primitive 
category of being (Physics 200b32– 201a3); instead, Aristotle 
will use some of the key ideas he has introduced elsewhere 
without adding anything more to his ontological “stock” 
in order to explain motion and change. These key ideas 
are: forms, the privation of form, the substratum of change, 
and the distinction between being in potentiality and being 
in actuality. He describes efficient causation as the “transmis-
sion” of a form from the mover to the movable:12
11. Aristotle’s definition allows for a great variety of cases to come under 
the mover– movable relation, including such cases as aging, which we 
would consider as untypical cases of causation at best.
12. This is, however, as we will see in a moment, only a figurative descrip-
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The mover will always transmit a form, either a “this” or such 
or so much, which, when it moves, will be the principle and 
cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what 
is potentially man. (Physics 202a9– 12)
So in general terms, in causal interactions between 
substances the agent transmits and the patient receives the 
form; the same form is involved “on both sides,” only that 
they relate to this form differently. The agent’s transmitted 
form is the cause; the privation of the form in the patient 
is what allows for its reception, and the physical process 
facilitating the transmission of the form is the substratum 
of the causal change (e.g., in building, the movements 
of the hands of the builder facilitate the transmission of 
the form of the house to the construction materials; for 
heating, contact facilitates the transmission of the form to 
the object heated). Describing (figuratively) causation in 
terms of “transmission of the form” plays an important role 
in Aristotle’s account of causation. In particular, it enables 
him to address the question of whether causation follows 
the order of time, with causes preceding their effects. If 
not, is it mere convention that in the causal interaction be-
tween the teacher and the pupil, teaching is the cause and 
learning the effect? Or is there an underlying metaphysical 
principle for the determination of the cause and the effect? 
Aristotle writes,
A man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which 
has sound is not always sounding. But when that which can 
hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is sounding, 
then the actually hearing and the actual sound come about at 
the same time (these one might call respectively hearkening 
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Aristotle is thus clear that actual causes do not precede their 
actual effect in time; teaching and learning (by being taught) 
cover the same time span. The passage just quoted also shows 
that Aristotle conceives of causation as the exercise of causal 
powers that get mutually activated:  the power of sounding 
in the example, and of hearing. The power to teach is in the 
teacher before she engages in actual teaching (and even if she 
may never engage in actual teaching), and so is the corre-
sponding passive power in the learner, but the actualization 
of these potentials is one and the same, hence there is com-
plete overlap in time between them.13 In the Physics Aristotle 
gives a metaphysical account of his key claim that the ac-
tualization of the active and the passive powers is one and 
the same, which is what also explains their temporal coinci-
dence. He writes:
Motion is the fulfillment of the potentiality of the movable 
by the action of that which has the power of causing mo-
tion .  .  . A thing is capable of causing motion because it can 
do this, it is a mover because it actually does it. But it is on the 
movable that is capable of acting. Hence there is a single actu-
ality of both of them alike. (Physics 202a13– 18, emphasis added)
Aristotle’s claim will look, at first sight, puzzling, but he 
explicates it when he examines some alternative accounts of 
what happens to the mover and the movable in causation in a 
dialectical puzzle in Physics III 3, 202a21– b5.14 In the course 
of this discussion, Aristotle rejects some of the possible 
13.  It is important to note, though, that this complete overlap does not 
raise problems for accounting for the direction of causation. For the direc-
tion of the transmission of the form is asymmetric, and that determines 
which is the agent and which the patient in the causal interaction.
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alternatives to the “single actuality” claim, while developing 
the rationale behind his own explanation of the “oneness” 
of agency and patiency. In brief, Aristotle considers two 
possibilities:  that the two actualities, of the mover and the 
movable, are different, or that they are one and the same. The 
first option seems to lead to a dilemma. If the two actualities 
are different, either they both occur in one of the two subjects 
(namely, either in the mover or the moved), or one occurs in 
each. If both actualities occur in one subject, then whichever 
has both actualities in it will change in two different ways 
in relation to one form. For example, when we take the case 
of A  teaching B, then one person would come to be both 
teaching and learning at the same time by teaching, and this 
is, to Aristotle, seems absurd (and, presumably, we can follow 
him in this assessment when we exclude those cases where 
someone teaches herself). If, on the other hand, the actuality 
of the mover is in the mover, and the actuality of the mov-
able is in the movable, then either the causal agency of the 
mover will impact only on the mover itself, and not on the 
movable (so the teacher will teach herself, but not the pupil), 
or it will impact on nothing (the teacher will teach nobody), 
in which case the mover is not a mover in actuality. Given 
that the assumption that the actualities are different leads to 
untenable results, it appears that the actualities cannot be dif-
ferent and must be one and the same. But this latter result is 
no less absurd, because agency and patiency cannot be the 
same. Aristotle’s own solution is that the two actualizations, 
of the agent’s and of the patient’s respective powers, are dif-
ferent, but also one, because interdependent, and they both 
take place in the patient. Immediately after developing the 
dilemma we just looked at, Aristotle states his own position 
on the issue:
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Nor is it necessary that the teacher should learn, even if to 
act and be acted on are one and the same, provided that they 
are not the same in respect of the account [logos] which states 
their essence [to ti ên einai] (as raiment and dress), but are the 
same in the sense in which the road from Thebes to Athens 
and the road from Athens to Thebes are the same, as has been 
explained above. (Physics 202b10– 14)
Thus, for Aristotle, even if both actualities are, in one sense, 
the same, they are different “in respect of their logos.” There 
has been much discussion in the literature concerning how 
to understand this last crucial term, logos, but the context 
makes it clear that it must refer to the definition of the re-
spective natures. For Aristotle uses in the passage the tech-
nical expression he has coined for essence (to ti ên einai, 
which we already know from the discussion of Aristotle’s es-
sentialism in section 3.2.). You might think that this reading 
makes Aristotle’s position even more puzzling. For it is a cor-
nerstone of Aristotle’s essentialism that if the essences of two 
things are of different kinds (say a wolf and a rabbit), the two 
things in question must be essentially and numerically dif-
ferent. What it is to be an agent is different from what it is to 
be a patient; their definitions are different (202a20, 202b22), 
and with them, their kind (202b1). Nonetheless, although 
the definitions stating their essences (202b12) are different, 
Aristotle maintains, “to act and to be acted on are one and 
the same” (202b11). The example he offers helps us to better 
understand what he means by this. The route from Athens 
to Thebes and the route from Thebes to Athens are, in one 
sense, “one and the same”: for these routes are embodied in 
the same stretch of the road. In the same way, the ground of 
the respective actualizations of agency and patiency is one 
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and the same, notwithstanding that agency and patiency are 
actualizations of essentially different powers. Aristotle states 
this explicitly when he writes:
To generalize, teaching is not the same in the primary sense 
with learning, nor is agency with patiency, but that to which 
those belong [scilicet] is the same for both, namely the motion; 
for the actualization of this [teaching] in that [learning] and 
the actualization of that [learning] through the action of this 
[teaching] differ in definition. (202b19– 22)
The two powers or potentialities in question differ in type, 
thus their actualities differ in type, too. But the actualities 
of the two potentialities (for teaching and for learning) 
are fulfilled in the motion that is the common activity that 
actualizes them both. The two potentialities can occur in 
actuality only together, and neither can happen without 
the other. The teacher is not teaching if the learner is not 
learning, and the learner (i.e., instructee) is not learning 
(being instructed) if the teacher is not teaching. The one-
ness of the activity grounding them accounts for the inter-
dependent actualization of the cause and the effect. At the 
same time, the two essences or forms that the activity bears 
preserve the bipolarity of the causal interaction. Lastly, as 
we will see in the next section, the fact that the activity that 
actualizes both agency and patiency is located in the patient 
grounds the distinction between agent and patient, and be-
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4 . 4   A R E  T H E R E  ACT IVE  A N D 
PAS S IVE  P O W E R S  I N V O LV E D 
I N   C AU S AT I O N ?
The Aristotelian view we discussed in the previous section 
has many attractive features. And, as we have noted at the 
end of section 4.2, the problems which neo- Humean ac-
counts of causation still face have motivated a growing 
number of philosophers to look back to Aristotle’s model of 
causation and to take over at least some crucial elements of 
it. Contemporary neo- Aristotelians do believe that one can 
provide an account of causation in terms of the actualization 
of potentialities (as Aristotle would have put it) or the exer-
cise of powers (as we would put it). This Aristotelian idea, 
they hold, allows us to revive the idea that causation involves 
“production,” and that the effects “derive” from their causes, 
which had been lost by the Humean tradition (Anscombe 
1993, 92). Different approaches to developing this have been 
tried out; they can be classified in different ways. One impor-
tant distinction depends on whether causation is accounted 
for in terms of the coming together or “coactivation” of dif-
ferent powers, active and passive; or whether causation need 
involve the manifestation of one kind of power only, namely 
an active power.15 Another important distinction can be 
drawn according to what these approaches take the relata of 
causation to be: powers themselves, events, or objects? And 
yet another distinction can be drawn according to whether 
15.  For the first view see, e.g., Marmodoro (2007) and Mumford and 
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one believes that all instances of causation, or only some, can 
be understood in terms of the activation of powers.16
Many— but not all— power theories of causation adopt 
the distinction between active and passive powers in some 
form or other. What makes this move attractive is that it 
promises to provide an explanation for the direction of cau-
sation, which, as we have seen in section 4.2, raises special 
difficulties for neo- Humeans. Some philosophers, though, 
have rejected the distinction between agent and patient in 
causal transactions, and argued that all causal transactions 
are symmetrical, in the sense that all involved transaction 
partners undergo changes equally. Take, for instance, the fol-
lowing passage by John Heil:
The received view of causation might lead you to think that the 
water and the salt are related as agent and patient: the water, 
or maybe the water’s enveloping the salt, causes the salt to dis-
solve. Perhaps the water possesses an “active power” to dissolve 
salt, and salt, a complementary “passive power” to be dissolved 
by water. But look more closely at what happens when you stir 
salt into a glass of water. Certain chemical features of the salt 
interact with certain chemical features of the water. . . . This in-
teraction is, or appears to be, continuous, not sequential; it is, 
or appears to be, symmetrical. (Heil 2012, 118)
16. In the literature, this last question is sometimes dealt with under the 
heading of whether all kind of causation is of one kind, e.g., substance- 
causation (Lowe 2002), or whether there are irreducibly different kinds of 
causation, e.g., some kinds where the causation consists in the activation 
of a causal power of a substance and others which run along more or less 
Humean lines. Some so- called agent- causalists in the free- will debate go 
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Much- discussed cases, that seem to display this symmetry 
in a particularly striking way, are cases where two cards lean 
against one another and sustain each other in their position 
(Heil 2017), and cases where a cube of ice cools the lem-
onade in a glass while being itself warmed up (and dissolved) 
(Mumford 2006). Cases such as the two mutually sustaining 
cards are very common in nature and show, according to Heil, 
that there is no real metaphysical distinction between agent 
and patient, and hence between the manifestation of active 
and passive powers. There is only one single manifestation of 
both, the fact that we call it “dissolving” or “being dissolved” 
(in the case of salt in water) is a perspectival matter based on 
how we look at events and what we are interested in.
Heil’s argument is not compelling, though. Let us grant, 
for the sake of the argument, that there are some cases of sym-
metrical interactions, like the case of the two cards leaning 
against one another. Even then it would be wrong to infer 
that all cases work like that. Let us return to our original case 
of the water dissolving the salt. Even if both the salt and the 
water change during the process, Heil’s claim that the inter-
action is fully symmetrical is unwarranted. For there are still 
important differences between what the salt and the water 
do to each other. For instance, polarized water molecules 
break the bond between the negative chloride ions and the 
positive sodium ions, while salt molecules do not break any 
water molecule. The chemical reaction is asymmetrical. The 
fact that water dissolves salt but not vice versa is scientif-
ically explicative:  if we say that water dissolves salt we are 
communicating scientific knowledge, and more specifically 
knowledge about the relevant causal process.
What then differentiates active and passive powers, 
if their distinction is what underpins the asymmetry and 
AQ: No 
Mumford 2006 
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directionality of causality? Their distinction can either be 
thought to be an absolute one, such that a power is (gener-
ally, by nature) either a passive or an active one; or a rela-
tive one, such that powers take on an active or passive “role” 
in causation depending on how they are involved in causal 
interactions, as Aristotle for instance thought. For Aristotle, 
a power is active if it causes a change in another power 
(or its bearer); and is passive if it (or its bearer) undergoes 
change. (Even if both powers change, one can change more 
or more radically than the other, as in the example of water 
and salt:  so we can still compare degrees of undergoing or 
causing change even then.) An alternative way to distinguish 
between active and passive powers focuses on the (relative) 
dependence of the manifestation of a power on the external 
circumstances. A power is comparatively more active, on this 
view, the wider the variety of circumstances under which it 
can manifest, and the less it has to be activated under these 
circumstances. This is one way to capture the idea that cau-
sation is tightly connected to the explanatory contribution 
something makes to an effect, and this explanatory contri-
bution is relatively greater for a power if the relative explana-
tory contribution of the external circumstances are relatively 
smaller.17 In both suggested ways of distinguishing active 
from passive powers, it is important to note, the attribution 
of active and passive roles is not merely based on epistemo-
logical considerations, but on metaphysical ones.18
17. See, e.g., Harré and Madden (1975); Mayr (2011, chap. 8).
18. Clearly, the attribution of active and passive role to powers in a causal 
interaction is neither easy nor unequivocal. However, this doesn’t mean 
that the distinction, in general, makes no sense, and this does not exclude 
that in some cases the active and passive powers are clearly distinguishable.
C4.N17
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4 . 5   M E N TA L  C AU S AT I O N
It seems a trivial truism that mental occurrences can have 
causal effects; and equally it seems obviously true that mental 
occurrences can cause not only other mental occurrences, 
but physical ones as well. Imagine yourself thinking hard 
about the solution to a mathematical problem (“What is 246 
+ 874?”) and suddenly grasping the solution (“Ah, it’s 1120!”). 
Your thinking “Ah, it’s 1120!” is a mental event. It can not 
only cause you to have other thoughts (e.g., your thinking 
“So the overall sum is 5698”), but can also have physical 
effects (e.g., your writing down “1120” on your exam sheet). 
Or imagine yourself feeling a sharp pang of pain as you touch 
an extremely hot cup of tea. Wouldn’t we naturally assume 
that it is your pain that causes you to cry out loud (which is 
a physical occurrence)? Again, when you intend to do some-
thing, this intention, it seems, can clearly impact causally on 
what you are doing: unless you are weak- willed or somehow 
prevented, your intention will make you act in certain ways.19 
These three cases, and others like it, seem to be clear cases of 
causation. So it seems obvious that mental occurrences can 
have both mental and physical effects.
Nonetheless, since the time of Descartes the problem 
of mental causation has been haunting metaphysicians. In 
Descartes’s own system the problem arises from his mind– 
body dualism, which includes a strict distinction between 
19. It is disputed whether this is best understood as your intention causing 
you to act in certain ways. But because we do not follow the traditional 
picture of event- causation here, we will set this problem aside, because the 
intention can at least manifest itself in your actions, which is enough for 
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purely mental entities (souls), which are characterized by 
the property of consciousness, and physical entities (bodies), 
which do not have any mental properties. Descartes’s du-
alism made the question of how these two types of sub-
stance, mind and body, could interact particularly pressing 
for him— while his philosophical assumptions made this 
question almost unanswerable. To begin with, the mind was, 
for Descartes, not localized in any part of the body, which 
left it completely mysterious how it could impact on the 
latter. Famously, Descartes thought that there was a specific 
organ in the body, the pineal gland, that allowed the soul to 
act upon the body, but positing that there was such an organ 
hardly solved the general problem of how a purely mental 
entity could interact at all with another object completely 
different from it. (Several philosophers indeed despaired 
that providing an answer to this question was possible; most 
notably Malebranche, who thought that every apparent in-
teraction between soul and body was mediated by divine in-
tervention. This view is known as Occasionalism.)
The problem of mental causation as it arose for Descartes 
was directly tied to his view of substance dualism: that is, the 
view that mental and physical substances formed two exclu-
sive kinds of substances that did not share any of their essen-
tial properties. Substance dualism has become very much a 
minority position today, however, and its demise has largely 
been due to its inability to explain causal interactions between 
mind and body. Nowadays, most philosophers accept some 
form of physicalism, according to which— minimally— all 
substances have physical properties and are physical entities. 
But the problem of mental causation has returned in different 
forms— and, indeed, it seems safe to assume that as long as 
mental and physical items, be they substances, properties, or 
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events, are considered to form exclusive sets— this problem 
will haunt philosophers in some form or other.20 Even if you 
believe that all substances are physical substances, you will 
still have to assume that some of substances have mental 
properties and states, and are subject to mental occurrences, 
too. We human beings, for instance, have mental properties 
and states: we have beliefs and desires, we sometimes feel joy, 
or acute pangs stabs of pain. How are these properties, states, 
and occurrences related to our physical properties and states, 
and the physical events in which we are involved?
One way to answer this question is to hold that mental 
properties and physical properties are identical; that is, that 
for every mental property P there is a physical property 
P’ (which may be a complex, or disjunctive, physical pro-
perty), such that P is identical with P’, and that instantiating 
P is the same as instantiating P’. There would then be no 
specific problem of mental causation any more:  if mental 
properties were identical with physical properties, their 
causal relevance would be explained just in the very same 
terms as the causal relevance of other physical properties. 
This view is held by reductive materialists— but it is not a 
view that many contemporary philosophers still subscribe to. 
Influential arguments (such as Hilary Putnam’s [1975] mul-
tiple realization argument that the same mental states can be 
realized by many different physical set- ups) have convinced 
20.  What makes an event or property a mental or a physical one? This 
question is a tricky one and not all participants in the debate give the same 
answer. Two features that have often been used to characterize mental 
items are consciousness (Descartes) or intentionality (Brentano). For a 
rough- and- ready characterization we will use the disjunction of both: X 
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most of them that mental and physical properties cannot 
be identical. If both properties are not identical, though, 
then types of mental states cannot be identical to types of 
physical states, either, and being in mental state P cannot 
be exactly the same thing as being in physical state P’. For 
plausibly, being in a certain state is (at least in part) defined 
as instantiating a certain property or standing in a certain 
relation, such that two states cannot be identical to one an-
other unless the properties involved are the same, too. Given 
that most of these philosophers still subscribe to a version of 
physicalism, their views are usually called versions of “non- 
reductive physicalism.”21
“Non- reductive physicalism” is, arguably, the main-
stream position in philosophy of mind today. But if mental 
and physical properties/ events/ states are not regarded as 
identical, the problem of mental causation rears its head 
again. One of the most influential contemporary versions of 
the problem has been formulated by Jaegwon Kim, with his 
so- called exclusion argument (1998, 30), which targets spe-
cifically non- reductive physicalists. Physicalists, says Kim, 
must assume that there is some connection between physical 
and mental properties, and one widely accepted way to think 
about this connection is in terms of supervenience. While 
there are differently notions of supervenience, the core idea 
is that properties of type A supervene on properties of type 
B if there can be no difference in the A- type properties of 
21.  Of course there are other options, too, in addition to believing that 
mental and physical properties are identical or believing they are fully sep-
arate. You might, for instance, think that one and the same property has 
both mental and physical aspects. But for ease of presentation, we will set 
these further options aside here.
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an object, state, or event, without some difference in the B- 
type properties (either of the object, state, or event itself or its 
“surroundings,” or history). Such a supervenience assump-
tion is very common, for example, with regard to the relation 
between moral and nonmoral properties: two actions cannot 
differ in their moral evaluation, it is widely assumed, unless 
there is some nonmoral difference between them as well. The 
same, Kim argues, can also be supposed to hold with regard 
to mental and physical properties:
Mental properties supervene on physical properties, in that 
necessarily any two things (in the same or different possible 
worlds) indiscernible in all physical properties are indiscern-
ible in mental respects. (Kim 1998, 10)
The instantiation of any mental properties must thus have 
an underlying “basis” in the instantiation of some physical 
properties, which is usually called the “supervenience base.” 
By itself, the supervenience thesis does not imply any claim 
that the physical properties are more basic than the mental 
ones. But most of the philosophers Kim’s argument was orig-
inally intended to address, being physicalists, would also ac-
cept that the physical properties are more fundamental, and 
that it is due to their instantiation that the mental properties 
are instantiated as they are (and not vice versa).
A second key assumption of the “exclusion argument” is 
the thesis of the “causal closure of the physical realm.” While 
there are different formulations of this thesis, the core idea is 
that the causal laws that govern the physical realm only allow 
for causation of physical events by other physical events, 
since for every physical event there is we can already provide 
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holds that this assumption of “causal closure” is another key 
tenet of physicalism that one cannot give up as long as one 
subscribes to at least a weak form of physicalism:
If you reject this principle, you are ipso facto rejecting 
the .  .  . completability of physics— that is, the possibility of a 
complete and comprehensive physical doctrine of all physical 
phenomena. . . . It is safe to assume that no serious physicalist 
could accept such a prospect. (Kim 1998, 40)
Now, it is not difficult to see that these background 
assumptions (that physical properties are fundamental and 
of causal closure of the physical) generate a fundamental dif-
ficulty for the possibility of mental causation. Let us begin 
with the question of whether, on this picture, mental events 
can cause physical effects. The answer is clearly no. If one 
reads the causal closure principle as generally excluding non-
physical causes for physical effects, it directly rules out this 
possibility. But even if one gives the principle a weaker for-
mulation (that is, allowing for the existence, in principle, of 
nonphysical causes in addition to physical ones), causation 
of physical effects by mental causes will be highly problem-
atic: for, by causal closure, the physical effects will already have 
physical causes, too, so what work is there left for the mental 
causes to do? To make matters worse, when the mental event 
appears as a putative cause of a physical event, there will be 
an obvious contender for the former’s causal role, namely 
the (physical) supervenience base of this mental event. All 
causal influence that the mental event could have will nec-
essarily reduce to the influence of this physical base— or so 
it seems. The case of mental- to- mental causation seems, at 
first, more promising, since the closure principle doesn’t tell 
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us anything about the causes of mental events. However, as 
Kim argued, even here there is fundamental problem. When 
a mental event A  causes another mental event B, B will 
also— according to the supervenience thesis principle— have 
a physical supervenience base B*. And, when B supervenes 
on B*, Kim claims, it is plausible to assume that one can only 
cause B by causing its supervenience base to obtain, that is, 
by causing B* to obtain. But since the obtaining of B* is a 
physical event, A’s causing B* would be a case of mental- to- 
physical causation— and, as the first part of the argument 
was meant to show, this kind of causation is ruled out by the 
causal closure principle. If we take this principle seriously, 
we will not take A  to be the genuine cause of B* (and, by 
extension, of B itself), but, instead, A’s supervenience base 
A*. Could one, however, not say that both A and A* cause 
B, because A* causes B via causing A? No, says Kim, be-
cause the supervenience relation is not a causal relation. 
Thus we do not have a causal chain going from A* via A to 
B* and B, but we have only a direct causal link from A* to 
B*. Attributing any causal role to A  (e.g., going directly to 
B) would be a merely gratuitous extra— and would make the 
case one of causal overdetermination, where B would have 
two independent causal histories which would both fully ex-
plain its occurrence. And it is implausible to think mental 
events and their physical supervenience bases would play 
such independent causal roles, which would lead to causal 
overdetermination.
Kim’s argument has encountered strong criticism— 
unsurprisingly, since, if successful, it would destroy too much 
of our commonsense picture of the world. Indeed, it would 
not only undermine mental causation (which would be bad 
enough); it would also (see, e.g., Humphreys 1997) “threaten” 
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the plausibility of practically all ordinary causal explanations, 
which are phrased in terms of macro- physical phenomena 
that are taken to supervene on microphysical ones. Surely, 
we do not think that ordinary causal explanations such as 
“the rise in temperature caused the plants to whither” are 
all false, even though we do think there are underlying mi-
crophysical phenomena (of which we yet lack full under-
standing) on which the rise in temperature and the withering 
of the plants supervene. Having to reject all such ordinary 
explanations seems in itself a conclusion that is too hard to 
accept, and that which gives us strong reasons for rejecting 
at least one of the premises Kim uses in his argument (e.g., 
Baker 1993). But which part of the setup of Kim’s argument 
should we deny? One might, of course, deny non- reductive 
physicalism in the first place. But given the latter’s popularity, 
the premise that has usually been taken to be most problem-
atic is the causal closure assumption. Why should we think 
that physical effects must have only physical causes, or that 
they must at least have a full causal history given in terms 
of physical causes only? We may have independent reasons 
for accepting some form of supervenience, but causal clo-
sure is not an intuitively plausible principle, since it clashes 
with many of our ordinary causal explanations, where we 
do explain physical effects by appeal to nonphysical causes. 
Indeed, seeing how this premise eventually leads us to deny 
(as long as we accept supervenience) that any phenomena 
other than microphysical phenomena can be causally effec-
tive, it is even doubtful that the robust “realism about sci-
ence” that is meant to motivate the principle (and which 
Kim clearly endorses; see preface of his Kim [1998]) really 
supports it. For such a realism about science should lead us, 
if anything, to be realist about the subject matters of all the 
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sciences, not just microphysics. At least the other natural sci-
ences, such as organic chemistry and biology, should, even 
for naturalist philosophers, be above suspicion. Of course, 
you might still worry about how the processes and events 
specified in these different sciences causally interact, so there 
is still some question to be answered here. But Kim’s argu-
ment is both specifically based on a “realism about science,” 
and derives from this that mental causation is impossible (not 
merely that it raises additional worries). And if we are gen-
uine realists about science, and not simply realists about mi-
crophysics only, this argument will not work, for there will 
be no reason to believe that in principle, only explanations of 
events in terms of causally effective microphysical processes 
can be genuine causal explanations. A  more liberal nat-
uralism that takes all the sciences seriously, may thus be a 
more “mature” successor to the physicalism of the kind Kim 
subscribes to, which is too deeply rooted in the reductionist 
programs of the first half and mid- twentieth century, which 
tried to find a common basis for all the sciences in physics. 
If such a more liberal naturalism is incompatible with causal 
closure and supervenience, and causal closure is the more 
dubious of the two premises, then all the worse for causal 
closure!
There is also another consideration that speaks strongly 
against the causal closure principle that Kim proposes, 
namely that when we focus on event causation, causes 
should be “proportional” to their effects (e.g., Yablo 1992).22 
The idea behind this “proportionality” response to Kim is the 
following: when we ask “What caused x?,” we do not always 
22. Yablo (1992, 227) argues that usually, among the various candidates for 
the cause of an effect, the most proportional candidate should be preferred.
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want to know the most specific factor that can be picked out; 
rather, we want to know the factor that “made the difference,” 
and this can be a relatively coarse- grained one. Imagine for 
instance that you are wearing a crimson red t- shirt and a bull, 
on seeing the t- shirt, gets angry and charges you. What was 
responsible for the anger of the bull (never mind Kim’s ar-
gument about the causal impact of mental events)? In some 
sense, obviously, your crimson t- shirt having the color it 
had. However, your t- shirt is not just crimson; it has a partic-
ular shade of crimson, for example, dark crimson. Its being 
crimson supervenes on its having this particular shade (it 
could not have had another color without some change with 
respect to this shade) and, in a way, its being crimson is due 
to its having that shade. Nonetheless, in response to the ques-
tion of what caused the bull to be angry, it would be wrong 
to single out the t- shirt’s specific shade as the causal factor. 
For the bull would have gotten angry regardless of which par-
ticular shade of crimson your t- shirt had:  its being crimson 
was all it took for the bull to get angry. So, it was the t- shirt’s 
being crimson that made the difference to the bull’s getting 
angry, not its having the particular shade of crimson it had.
This shows that sometimes it is the supervenient pro-
perty that makes the difference and is rightly singled out as 
the cause, rather than its supervenience base. Even if every 
instantiation of a mental property is supposed to have a 
physical supervenience base, it might therefore still be the 
instantiation of the mental property that makes the differ-
ence, rather than the instantiation of the physical property 
that underlies it. Assume that one supervenient mental pro-
perty instantiation can have different physical supervenience 
bases:  then which of these different bases occurred in the 
particular case under consideration might be completely 
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irrelevant to the occurrence of an effect. The only relevant 
factor is that the mental property was instantiated, regardless 
of what its underlying base was on that particular occasion.
There are therefore several possible ways to respond 
to Kim’s exclusion argument. There are even more options 
if we adopt a power- based view of causation of the sort we 
have discussed in sections 4.3. and 4.4. As we have seen in 
 chapter 2, powers are at least partly individuated by what they 
are powers to do (i.e., their characteristic manifestations). At 
the same time, that a power’s manifestation includes a phys-
ical effect does not automatically mean that the power is a 
purely physical, nonmental one. For the conditions for its 
exercise, or its exercise itself, may essentially involve mental 
elements too. Assume you have an active power to bring 
about a physical effect in the world— for example to move 
your arm. Need this power be a physical one? Not neces-
sarily, especially if we take the rough- and- ready criterion of 
“mental” that X is a mental property if it essentially involves 
consciousness or intentionality.23 For your power might be 
a power to move your arm when you want to: then its exer-
cise would essentially involve intentionality and the power 
would thus count as a mental power. Nonetheless, the effect 
of the manifestation of this power is something physical: that 
your arm moves. Already in virtue of this rather trivial 
feature— that they have characteristic manifestations, while, 
at the same time, having a physical manifestation does not 
necessitate that a power is physical one— powers can much 
more easily bridge the putative divide between mental and 
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the problem of mental causation arose.24 Adopting a power- 
based account of causality thus brings with it the hope that 
mental causation might be no more problematic than other 
forms of causation. And given how commonplace a feature 
of our world mental causation is, this seems just another at-
tractive feature of such account.
4 . 6   C O N C L U S I O N S
Causality plays a crucial role in every attempt to explain the 
fabric of the world. However, as we have seen in this chapter, 
there is no agreement among philosophers about how to ac-
count for causation. We have examined the main alternatives 
in the debate, tracing them back to Aristotle and Hume. We 
have seen that an account of causation based on realism 
about powers has the resources to overcome key issues that 
afflict Humeanism. The advantages of the former emerged 
also in relation to the debate on mental causation, where re-
alism about powers would allow us to avoid the influential 
causal exclusion argument.
*
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tion of powers could turn the tables on Kim’s argument see Mayr (2011, 
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